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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VESSELS IN INLAND WATERS
ARE SUBJECT TO SUSPICIONLESS BOARDING - United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2573
(1983).
INTRODUCTION
Many defense attorneys have long felt that the fourth amend-
ment assumes different dimensions in drug cases and the breadth
of its protection shrinks in proportion to the quantity of drugs in-
volved.' Because of the war on the illegal importation of controlled
substances by the United States Coast Guard and the Customs
Service, and the proximity of Latin America to the long coastline
of the states of the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic, issues
have arisen about the propriety of stopping and searching vessels.
The recent ruling by the Supreme Court in United States v. Vil-
lamonte-Marquez2 restricting the fourth amendment indicates
that protections against unreasonable search and seizure are giving
way to battle the fast-spreading drug enforcement problem.
Title 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) s authorizes customs officers to
"board any vessel at any time and at any place" in the United
States to examine the vessel's manifest and other documents.4 A
similar provision, 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)5 which provides the Coast
Guard with similar authority, has been referred to as "one of the
1. Gaskins, The Fourth Circuit and the Fourth Amendment: Removing the
High From the Seas, 3 CAM'. L. REv. 1, 27 (1981).
2. -U.S-, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976).
4. Id. Section 1581(a) provides:
[A]ny officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel
... at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or
• ..within a customs enforcement area. . . or at any other authorized
place, without as well as within his district . . . and examine, inspect,
and search the vessel. . . and every part thereof.
19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (1976) defines "customs waters" as extending four leagues
(about 12 nautical miles) from the coast. While § 1581(a) is primarily applicable
to the Customs Service, commissioned, warrant and petty officers of the Coast
Guard are designated as officers of the customs by § 1401(i).
See also 46 U.S.C. § 277 (1976) (provides similar authority for "[a]ny officer
concerned in the collection of revenues"); 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) (provides simi-
lar authority to the Coast Guard).
5. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976).
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most sweeping grants of police authority ever written into U.S.
law."' United States v. Villamonte-Marquez presented the Su-
preme Court with the undecided issue of whether the fourth
amendment7 is offended when customs officers, acting pursuant to
section 1581(a), and without any suspicion of wrongdoing, board a
vessel located in inland waters providing ready access to the sea.8
The status of the law prior to this decision was muddled and con-
flicting. The Ninth Circuit has limited the scope of 19 U.S.C. §
1581(a) and its sister statute, 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), by adhering closer
to fourth amendment limitations,9 while the Fifth Circuit has ac-
cepted them in a broader interpretation of permissible police
conduct. 10
However, one theme which is consistent in the Courts' rulings
in this area is that whenever possible the decision to make such
searches and seizures should not be left to the unbridled discretion
of officers in the field." The Court has refused to permit warrant-
less random inspections for safety purposes whether directed at
6. S. EVANS, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 1790-1915, 218 (1949) (refer-
ring to Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 705, 49 Stat. 1820, predecessor to 14 U.S.C. §
89(a) (1976)).
7. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. 103 S. Ct. at 2573.
9. United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979) (random nightime
safety checks of boats violate the fourth amendment); United States v. Odneal,
565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1977) (Coast Guard is subject to limitations imposed by the
fourth amendment); United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976) (a stop
under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976) requires probable cause or a search warrant un-
less a border stop).
10. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979) (despite the
absence of known border crossing facts, detaining the defendants ashore and con-
ducting a brief inspection aboard the vessel was reasonable under the fourth
amendment), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States v. Freeman, 579
F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978) (upheld stop under § 1581(a)); United States v. Warren,
578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (upheld a stop and search under § 89(a), reversed
on other grounds, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Whitaker, 592
F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1979) (the fourth amendment does not prohibit document in-
spections in the absence of any suspicion in customs waters), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 950 (1979).
11. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.8 (Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 6:183
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residential premises,'2 business premises,' 3 or automobiles,14 or for
documentation purposes, whether to establish citizenship,' 5 or the
presence of a driver's license and vehicle registration.' 6 Because of
the conflict between the circuits and the importance of the ques-
tion as it affects the enforcement of customs laws, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Villamonte-Marquez to resolve this
problem.'"
The Court held that the U.S. Customs officers' "suspicionless"
boarding of a sailboat in inland waters providing ready access to
the sea, while no less random than highway stops condemned in
earlier cases,' 8 was reasonable under the fourth amendment in
light of the waterborne setting, the complexity of vessel registra-
tion, and the limited nature of the intrusion.'9 The Court took a
large step forward in the fight against increasing problems of drug
enforcement along the Nation's borders, but it severely restricted
the fourth amendment's protection of one's expectation of privacy
from governmental intrusion regarding vessels in inland waters.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the fourth amendment
implications of the holding in Villamonte-Marquez. The Note will
examine the Court's treatment of Section 1581(a) under which the
search arose, analyze the judicial treatment of the decisions relied
on by the Court and criticize the Court's treatment of the "reason-
ableness" of the governmental intrusion. The Note concludes that
because private cabin-boaters have great interests against arbitrary
intrusion by officials, cases such as Villamonte-Marquez should be
scrutinized more carefully to preserve the protection of the fourth
amendment.
12. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
13. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), see infra text accompanying
note 71.
15. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), see infra text ac-
companying note 62.
16. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
17. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
18. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), see infra text accompanying
note 71; United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), see infra text
accompanying note 59; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 420 U.S. 543 (1976), see
infra text accompanying note 67; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975), see infra text accompanying note 62; and United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891 (1975), see infra note 60.
19. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
1984]
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THE CASE
While patrolling the Calcasien Ship Channel some 18 miles in-
land from the Gulf of Mexico, customs officers sighted an
anchored, 40-foot sailboat.2 0 The Calcasien channel connects the
Gulf of Mexico with Lake Charles, Louisiana, a Customs Port of
Entry.2 1 While there is access to the channel from Louisiana's Cal-
casien Lake, the canal is a separate thoroughfare to the west of the
lake through which all vessels moving between Lake Charles and
the open sea of the Gulf Coast must travel.2' The wake of a passing
vessel caused the sailboat to rock violently. 2' The patrol ap-
proached the Henry Morgan II, sighting one man on deck." The
officers asked twice if the sailboat and crew were all right.'5 The
man, Hamparian, shrugged his shoulders in an unresponsive man-
ner. 6 A customs officer and an accompanying Louisiana state po-
liceman 27 then boarded the vessel and asked to see the vessel's
documentation.'8 While examining the registry," the customs of-
ficer smelled what he thought to be burning marijuana.80 Looking
through the open hatch, he observed burlap-wrapped bales that
proved to be marijuana."' Respondent Villamonte-Marquez was on
a sleeping bag atop the bales.3 ' Hamparian and Villamonte-Mar-
quez were arrested." A subsequent search revealed some 5,800
pounds of marijuana stored in almost every conceivable place.3
Before trial, respondents unsuccessfully attempted to suppress
20. Id. at 2576.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2576-77.
26. Id.
27. The Court did not attach any significance to the Louisiana state police-
man's boarding the boat along with the customs officer.
28. 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
29. Hamparian handed the customs officer what appeared to be a request to
change the registration of a ship from Swiss registry to French registry, written in
French. It was later discovered that the home port designation of the vessel was
Basel, Switzerland; the vessel was of French registry. Id.
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
[Vol. 6:183
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the marijuana evidences6 on the ground that the search was unrea-
sonable under the fourth amendment.3 6 Respondents were found
guilty of various federal drug offenses upon trial in Federal District
Court for the Fifth District.-7 However, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction on grounds that the of-
ficers' boarding "was not reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment," because the boarding occurred in the absence of a "reason-
able suspicion of a law violation."3 8 That court examined the
judicial construction of Section 1581(a) and concluded that the
broad language of the statute was circumscribed by the reasonable-
ness requirement of the fourth amendment." The court also held
that whether a reasonable suspicion exists in a particular case de-
pends on the totality of circumstances and that an officer's hunch
of generalized suspicion of criminal activity is not sufficient to au-
thorize the boarding of a vessel.'
35. Respondents sought to have the marijuana excluded as evidence pursuant
to the exclusionary rule which prohibits the admissibility of evidence unlawfully
obtained. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
See White, Forgotten Points In The Exclusionary Rule Debate, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 1273 (1983), stating that the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy fashioned
to protect those rights that are granted by the fourth amendment against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. It accomplishes this by deterring unlawful police
conduct, but is sensible to apply only to those situations in which its deterrent
purpose is advanced. Id. at 1273.
36. Objects falling into plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant and may be
introduced into evidence. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) proscribes the importation of marijuana; 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) proscribes the possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute; and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) proscribes the conspiracy to possess mari-
juana with intent to distribute.
38. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1981).
It is noteworthy that the Fifth Circuit recently upheld the boarding of a similar
boat and subsequent seizure of marijuana because the totality of the circum-
stances warranted a reasonable suspicion. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d
1303, 1316 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980) (officers did have
reasonable suspicion of a customs violation after observing that the boat had been
riding heavy in the bow and had sped through a "no wake" area in violation of
navigation laws).
39. United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981); United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1147 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965 (1980); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942,
945 (5th Cir. 1978).
40. 652 F.2d at 488.
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On appeal by the government,"1 the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court relied on section 1581(a)'s historical authorization of
suspicionless boarding, but more importantly, found that the
boarding was reasonable under the fourth amendment in light of
the important governmental interests in fighting drug smuggling
operations and ensuring compliance with vessel regulations, the
major differences of waterborne traffic as compared to vehicular
traffic, and the limited nature of the intrusion.'2
BACKGROUND
The state of the law with respect to the validity of suspi-
cionless boarding of vessels before Villamonte-Marquez was one of
contradiction and uncertainty. Professor W. LaFave states in his
treatise on Search and Seizure that there was no effort to develop a
systematic fashion of analysis in any of the appellate decisions. 43
The Court in Villamonte-Marquez based the reasonableness of the
boarding on earlier automobile search cases. The finding of reason-
ableness under the fourth amendment was the ultimate basis of
the decision, but the Court did give some weight to the validity of
section 1581(a) authorizing the boarding.
In 1886, the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States,"
quoted the history of the customs statute which was a predecessor
to Section 1581(a): 45
As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for
adoption of the original amendments to the Constitution, it is
clear that the members of that body did not regard search and
seizure of this kind as "unreasonable" and they are not embraced
within the prohibition of the amendment.46
The first customs statute, referred to in Boyd, was enacted in
1789, and granted customs officials, "full power and authority" to
41. Respondents argued that since the Court of Appeals vacated their convic-
tions, thus dismissing the indictments against them, the case was moot. However,
the Supreme Court held that the case was not moot on appeal since the indict-
ment was merged into the judgment upon their original conviction and since a
reversal of the Court of Appeals judgment would have the effect of reinstating the
judgment of conviction. 103 S. Ct. 2575-76, n. 2 (1983).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
43. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, at § 10.8 p. 135.
44. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
45. The Coast Guard has authority under § 1581 to enforce the customs laws;
see supra note 4.
46. 116 U.S. at 623.
[Vol. 6:183
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enter and search "any ship or vessel in which they have reason to
suspect goods, wares, or merchandise subject to duty shall be con-
cealed. ."' Thus, the First Congress limited customs officers to a
"reasonable ground to suspect" the concealment of goods before
entering and searching any vessel in the initial act.
In 1790 the Revenue Cutter Service was established.' 8 Section
31 of that act allowed "officers of the revenue cutters to go on
board of ships or vessels in any part of the United States. .. for
the purpose of demanding manifests ... and of examining and
searching the said ships or vessels."" Thus the latter statute did
not contain the "reason to suspect" requirement found in the first
customs statute. This is important because Boyd refers to the first
1789 statute, yet the Court in Villamonte-Marquez relied on the
1790 statute and still quoted Boyd. The Supreme Court has not
considered the constitutionality of a boarding and search based
solely on Section 1581(a). The statute, however, has been con-
strued in circuit court decisions.50
The Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. Stanley, 1 is
typical of the normal judicial construction of section 1581(a). In
Stanley, which dealt with the search of a Mexican vessel, the court
held that an act of Congress cannot validate searches which offend
fourth amendment protections, and a search based solely on Sec-
tion 1581(a) would be unreasonable unless it fell within an excep-
tion to the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
47. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
48. Ch. 35, § 62, 1 Stat. 175 (1790).
49. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (1790) provides:
that it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspec-
tors, and officers of the revenue cutters to go on board of ships or vessels
in any part of the United States or within four leagues of the coast
thereof, if bound to the United States, whether in or out of their respec-
tive districts, for the purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and
of examining and searching the said ships or vessels; and the said officers
respectively shall have free access to the cabin and every other part of
the ship or vessel.
50. Circuit courts have also construed the validity of 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1976)
providing the Coast Guard with similar authority. See United States v. Piner, 608
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979) (search conducted in internal waters of the United States
and after dark is subject to at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion);
United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1977), see supra note 9; United
States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979), see supra note 10; United
States v. Warren, 579 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978), see supra note 10.
51. 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976).
1984]
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searches and seizures.52 Likewise, the Supreme Court has stated
that a warrant based on probable cause is required by the fourth
amendment "subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." 3 While it is fair to say that the stat-
ute confers some authority upon customs officers, "it can also be
said that this statutory provision cannot constitutionally be given a
broad or even literal reading." It is understandable therefore that
the statutory language has been judicially construed in a more re-
strictive manner. Thus, Section 1581(a) authority has been con-
fined to border searches.'5 Under the border search doctrine, mere
entry into the United States is sufficient to make a search reasona-
ble under the fourth amendment. The Court has justified border
searches based on the interests of national self-protection and "the
long standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping
and examining persons and property crossing into this country."
Because of the absence of cases dealing with the validity of Section
1581(a) suspicionless boarding of vessels, the Court in Villamonte-
Marquez based its decision on automobile cases which involve the
border search and the administrative stop exceptions to the fourth
amendment.
Although the Court has never considered the constitutionality
of a border search of a vessel,' in recent decisions the Court has
limited the scope of border searches of automobiles." In Almeida-
52. Id. at 665.
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
54. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, at § 10.8, p. 131 (referring to 14 U.S.C. §
89(a) (1976) granting similar authority to the Coast Guard).
55. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (referring to predeces-
sors to § 1581 as border search statutes). The "border search" is a well established
practice under which persons crossing the international borders of the country
and their luggage and effects may be searched without warrants and in the ab-
sence of probable cause. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1581, 1582 (1930). See also Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
56. 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
57. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following cases involving
border stops and searches of vessels: United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965 (1980); United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d
826 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); United States v. Warren,
578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v.
Odneal, 556 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); United
States v. Jones, 528 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1975).
58. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), see infra text ac-
companying note 59; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), see
infra text accompanying note 62; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
[Vol. 6:183
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Sanchez v. United States,9 a case involving the stop of a vehicle
about twenty-five miles from the Mexican border by a roving bor-
der patrol, the Court held that the search violated the fourth
amendment because it was based on neither consent nor probable
cause to believe a violation had occurred. 0 The Court also found
that routine border searches were only permissible at the border or
its functional equivalent.61 The Court found that although the gov-
ernment had legitimate interests in preventing the illegal entry of
aliens, this was outweighed by the individual's interests in freedom
from the arbitrary intrusion based upon the sole discretion of an
officer.2
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce" the Court held that "ex-
cept at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving
patrols may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articul-
able facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who
may be illegally in the country."" The Court used a balancing ap-
proach, stating that the reasonableness of government intrusion
depends on the balance between public interest and the individ-
ual's right to personal security, free from arbitrary interference by
law officers.' The Court found that the legitimate governmental
interest in preventing the illegal entry of aliens was outweighed by
the individual's fourth amendment protection from the govern-
mental intrusion."
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,67 the Court upheld the
authority of the Border Patrol to maintain permanent checkpoints
at or near intersections of important roads leading away from the
border at which a vehicle would be stopped for brief questioning of
its occupants even if there is no reason to believe the particular
(1976), see infra text accompanying note 67; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975) (held warrantless search by border patrol without probable cause at traffic
checkpoints removed from the border or its functional equivalent violated fourth
amendment).
59. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
60. Id. at 273.
61. Id. at 272-73.
62. Id. at 275.
63. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
64. Id. at 884.
65. Id. at 878.
66. Id. at 882-83.
67. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
1984]
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vehicle contains illegal aliens." The Court in Martinez-Fuerte
found that the practice of checkpoint operations was a lesser intru-
sion upon the motorist's fourth amendment interests, thus a brief
stop and questioning was not unreasonable.69
In addition to the border search exception, the fourth amend-
ment also yields to the administrative search exception.7° An ad-
ministrative agency may make a warrantless stop for purposes of
inspection, based on neither consent nor probable cause, of a vehi-
cle if related to strictly regulated industries. Although the Supreme
Court has not decided the constitutionality of administrative stops
of vessels, in the recent decision of Delaware v. Prouse,7 ' the Court
held a random administrative stop of an automobile unconstitu-
tional. The Court found that the patrolman's intrusion to ensure
that only qualified persons were operating vehicles, that the vehi-
cles were fit for safe operation, and that licensing, registration and
safety inspection requirements were being observed-each further-
ing legitimate governmental interests-was outweighed by the in-
dividual's fourth amendment interests. 2 In each of these cases, all
of which the Court relied on in its analysis in Villamonte-Mar-
quez, the single consistent factor for determining whether the
fourth amendment was offended was the balancing test for the rea-
sonableness of the intrusion.7 3 The test the Court used was the in-
trusion of a particular law enforcement practice on an individual's
fourth amendment interest balanced against its promotion of a le-
gitimate governmental interest.74 This is most significant because
it is the ultimate basis on which the Villamonte-Marquez decision
is based.7 5
68. Id. at 545.
69. Id.at 558.
70. The administrative search was created to deter violations of regulations
by subjecting certain industries to random inspections. See Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970).
71. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
72. Id. at 654-55.
73. The purpose of the fourth amendment is to maintain a standard of "rea-
sonableness" upon the discretionary power of government officials. See Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
74. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654 (1979). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2579.
[Vol. 6:183
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ANALYSIS
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 7  the Court held
that the suspicionless boarding of a sailboat anchored in inland
waters was consistent with the fourth amendment's protections
against unreasonable search and seizure." In an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court began its analysis by noting the lineal history
of Section 1518 (a), tracing its ancestry to an act by the First Con-
gress in 1790 which authorized the suspicionless boarding of ves-
sels by governmental officials. 78 Finding the 1790 act as the statute
appearing to be the ancestor of the present provision, Section
1851(a), the Court, citing Boyd v. United States,7 9 stated that the
statute reflected that in the First Congress' view, the same Con-
gress that promulgated the Constitutional amendments, such
boardings are not contrary to the fourth amendment.8 0 The Court
then promptly dispensed with statutory discussion and moved on
to the real basis of its holding, the reasonableness of officers' ac-
tions under the fourth amendment.81 The court relied on recent
automobile search cases holding that while random stops of vehi-
cles away from the Nation's borders without any articulable suspi-
cion of unlawful conduct are not permissible,2 vehicle stops at
fixed checkpoints or at roadblocks are.8 In stating that this type of
cases focuses on the fourth amendment question of "reasonable-
ness," the court quoted Prouse: "The permissibility of a particular
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's fourth amendment interest against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests.""
The Court stated that if customs officers had stopped a car on
a highway near the border, rather than a sailboat in a ship channel,
76. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
77. Id.
78. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (1790), see supra note 49.
79. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Note, Boyd referred to the original customs act of
July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 which provided for a "reasonable cause to suspect"
before a boarding was permissible.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
81. Id. at 2579.
82. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), see supra text ac-
companying notes 63-66; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), see supra text
accompanying notes 71-72.
83. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), see supra text ac-
companying notes 67-69; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
84. 440 U.S. at 654.
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the stop would have clearly violated the "reasonableness" principle
embodied by the fourth amendment."' The stop and boarding of
the sailboat in Villamonte-Marquez was found to be reasonable for
four reasons.
First, the factual differences between vessels located in waters
offering ready access to the sea and automobiles on highways were
found sufficient to require a different result." The Court found
permanent checkpoints on waters such as the Calcasien River Ship
Channel impractical, since vessels can move in any direction at any
time and need not follow established avenues as automobiles. 87 It
found no practical alternatives in spotting all vessels which might
have come from the open sea and herding them into a canal to
make fixed checkpoint stops.8 8 Although rivers and canals in in-
land waters may make a roadblock approach more feasible, waters
providing ready access to the sea do not.89 Moreover, if check-
points were fixed at ports, as petitioners argued, then the boat cap-
tain could merely anchor in an obscure location, or transfer the
cargo from one vessel to another and avoid the checkpoints.90
Secondly, documentation requirements with respect to vessels
are significantly different from the system of vehicle licensing used
throughout the states.' Vessel documentation is very complex and
more extensive, so customs officers cannot tell, merely by observing
the standard license plate or inspection sticker found on vehicles,
whether the laws are being complied with. 2
Thirdly, the enforcement of documentation law serves the
public interests in assuring environmental standards, the collection
of customs duties, regulations of imports and exports, and particu-
larly the prevention of entry into the United States of controlled
substances, illegal aliens, prohibited medicines, dangerous chemi-
cals and the like.9 Those interests were found most substantial in
waters which connect the open sea with a Custom Port of Entry.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2579. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975).
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2579-80.
87. Id. at 2580.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2581.
94. Id.
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Finally, the Court found that while the need to make docu-
ments checks was great, the resulting intrusion on fourth amend-
ment interests was limited."' Conceding that the intrusion did in-
terfere with one's ability to make "free passage without
interruption,""" the Court found that it involved a brief detention
where officers boarded, visited public areas of the vessel and in-
spected documents, all of which was limited to what could be seen
without a search.' Thus the interference created only a "modest
intrusion.""
In the majority's opinion these factors tended to make the sus-
picionless boarding of the Henry Morgan II a special case; thus it
was reasonable procedure."
In a dissent by Justice Brennan,100 joined by Justice Marshall,
the majority was criticized for upholding the boarding and search
on the grounds that there are differences between cars and boats
sufficient to justify such a "blatant departure from solid and recent
constitutional precedent." 10 1 The dissent pointed out the prece-
dents, Almeida-Sanchez, Brignoni-Ponce, Ortiz, Martinez-Fuerte
and Prouse, which uniformly held that any stop or search requires
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or another discretion-limiting
feature such as the use of fixed checkpoints instead of roving pa-
trols. 02 The dissent criticized the majority for overlooking the pri-
mary concern guiding previous decisions which was the unqualified
and consistent rejection of "standardless and unconstrained discre-
tion."103 Justice Brennan added that it does not follow "that be-
cause police in a given situation claim to need more intrusive and
arbitrary enforcement tools than the fourth amendment has been
held to permit, we may therefore dispense with the fourth amend-
ment's protections."'104
The dissent also argued against the majority's supposed fac-
95. Id.
96. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
97. 103 S. Ct. 2581.
98. Id. at 2582.
99. Id.
100. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens first criticized the Court's hold-
ing that the case was not moot, despite the voluntary dismissal of the prosecution
by the government. Id.
101. 203 S. Ct. at 2585-91.
102. Id. at 2585.
103. Id. at 2586. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
104. 103 S. Ct. at 2586.
1984]
13
Young: Criminal Procedure - Vessels in Inland Waters Are Subject to Susp
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
tual differences. 05 It pointed out that the boarding took place in a
channel which all vessels moving between Lake Charles and the
Gulf must travel, thus relevant traffic could be funneled into a
checkpoint.1°6 Also, Justice Brennan argued that most safety de-
fects are detectable by visual means without the necessity of ran-
dom stops and that the nature of illegal traffic and the characteris-
tics of smuggling operations generate articulable means of spotting
violators. °1 0  The dissent questioned why the non-uniform docu-
mentation of vessels was a necessary or permanent state of af-
fairs.10 8 It asserted that a uniform and more simple means of vessel
documentation could be achieved easily and inexpensively. 109 In
stating that the intrusion was more than modest, the dissent went
on to criticize the majority for overlooking the obviously greater
expectation of privacy people enjoy on boats since boats often
serve as temporary dwellings.110 Finally, the dissent questioned
why an actual boarding was necessary anyway, since the officer
could simply pull along side and request someone from the vessel
to come on board the police vessel with the appropriate
documents.1
The dissenting opinion was proper because it held to the pre-
cedent cases which indicate that the primary concern in this area
of the fourth amendment is to protect the individual from unbri-
dled police discretion, and the dissent applied the test of reasona-
bleness with more careful scrutiny. The majority fell short, but the
dissent was prepared to consider alternatives such as the possibil-
ity of a uniform system of documentation for vessels, alternative
use of fixed checkpoints for vessels when available, and the possi-
bility of having the documentations inspection conducted aboard
the officer's vessel instead of the individual's. The dissent properly
seeks to exhaust all alternatives before derogating from the funda-
mental right as set forth by our forefathers against unreasonable
search and seizures.
The majority pointed out that boats, unlike automobiles, need
not follow established routes, thus checkpoints fixed along water-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2589.
107. Id. at 2590.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2588-89.
111. Id. at 2590.
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ways and at Customs Ports of Entry could be averted.112 However,
the dissent was correct in examining the facts at hand. There was
no other avenue available for the Henry Morgan II since the Cal-
casien Ship Channel was the only passageway between Lake
Charles and the Gulf.118 True, there are numerous waterways pro-
viding ready access to the sea on our Nation's coast which do offer
unestablished avenues for sailing and make roadblock type stops
impractical. However, the facts in Villamonte-Marquez show that
the waterway in question did not have alternative routes and made
very feasible a roadblock type of stopping device. Thus, the Court
erred in generalizing about all inland waterways rather than ana-
lyzing the facts as presented.
On the other hand, the dissent's suggestion that a uniform sys-
tem of documentation could be provided easily and inexpensively
is without substantiation. A thorough study into possible alterna-
tives and their implementation is necessary before reaching such a
conclusion. Moreover, as the majority point out, "[s]o long as the
method chosen by Congress is constitutional, then it matters not
that alternative methods exist."'14
Oddly enough, the majority began its analysis with a discus-
sion of our forefathers' intentions when enacting the lineal ances-
tor to Section 1581(a). It then asserted that the present law had
quite an impressive history in allowing the suspicionless boarding
of vessels. 1" 5 The Court mistakenly referred to Boyd v. United
States"16 when it asserted that boardings of this kind were not con-
sidered unconstitutional by the framers of the fourth amendment.
The Court in Boyd referred to the first customs statute of 1789"
in its holding that suspicionless boardings were not unreasona-
ble." s8 However, that statute contained a provision requiring "rea-
sonable cause to suspect," before customs officers could enter and
search any vessel."' The initial reasonable suspicion requirement
of our Nation's first customs statute suggests that the "impressive
historical pedigree" 20 of the current statute is not quite as impres-
112. Id. at 2580.
113. Id. at 2576.
114. Id. at 2580. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
115. 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
116. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
117. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
118. 116 U.S. at 623.
119. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
120. 103 S. Ct. at 2573.
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sive. Although the statute confers some authority upon the cus-
toms officers, it "cannot constitutionally be presumed to be given a
broad or even literal reading."' 1 Moreover, every statute enacted
by the First Congress cannot be presumed to be constitutional
since they too were imperfect humans.
Most importantly is the majority's mistake not to consider cir-
cuit courts' construction of Section 1581(a). Although the circuit
courts have disagreed on the issue of reasonableness, they seem to
be in accord with the view taken in United States v. Stanley"'s
which held that a search based solely on Section 1581(a) would be
unreasonable unless it fell into an exception to the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1' 8 In
any event, the Court did not devote a lot of time to carefully ana-
lyzing the statute, but properly recognized that the boarding and
search in Villamonte-Marquez would have to be found reasonable
in order to withstand constitutional attack. In basing its decision
on the reasonableness of the intrusion, the Court, in effect, indi-
cated that the statute by itself is insufficient to justify the officers'
suspicionless boarding, or at least, left the question open.
Villamonte-Marquez approved an entirely random seizure and
detention of individuals and a boarding of a private, noncommer-
cial premises by police officers, without any limits on the officers'
discretion or safeguards against abuse. The Court did not assert
that such a result was warranted by precedent permitting such
broad and unchecked authority. Rather, the Court recognized that
the applicable cases were those governing search or stops of vehi-
cles by officers on random patrol or at a fixed checkpoint.'2 The
most significant flaw in the Court's reasonableness application was
its failure to adhere to the principles as set forth by these prece-
dents requiring probable cause, articulable suspicion or some kind
of discretion-limiting device such as fixed checkpoints. In Al-
meida-Sanchez the Court held that police on roving patrols must
have probable cause.before stopping and searching a vehicle near
121. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, at § 10.8, p. 131.
122. 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976). For cases that hold some articulable suspi-
cion or probable cause is required for a search based on 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1976), the
present law's sister statute, see supra note 50.
123. 545 F.2d at 665.
124. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fu-
erte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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the border."" In United States v. Ortiz"' the Court held that the
police must have probable cause to search a vehicle at fixed check-
points.127 In both of those cases the discretion of the police was
limited by probable cause. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held that
Border Patrol officers on roving patrol could stop vehicles and
question occupants only if there was a reasonable suspicion of a
law violation. 12 Likewise in Martinez-Fuerte, the court held that
officers could stop and question vehicles without suspicion only at
fixed checkpoints.1 29 In those two cases the discretion of the police
is again limited: Brignoni-Ponce limits it by requiring a reasonable
suspicion; Martin-Fuerte limits it by allowing the stop only at
fixed checkpoints. In Prouse, these precedents were affirmed as the
Court held that stops of vehicles were allowed only if made on a
reasonable suspicion or at fixed checkpoints. 30 The Court in
Prouse properly recognized that the "marginal contribution of ran-
dom highway stops cannot justify subjecting every occupant of
every vehicle on the roads to a seizure-limited in magnitude com-
pared to other intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cogniza-
ble-at the unbridled discretion of law-enforcement officials."' 3 '
Thus, the majority overlooks the primary principle embodied in
each of these cases, the "standardless and unconstrained discre-
tion' 3 2 of police officers in the field.
Not only does the Court fall to uphold the same type of dis-
cretion-limiting standard, but it also fails to properly weigh other
factors in its balancing approach. In judging the boarding of the
Henry Morgan II by balancing the intrusion upon petitioner's
fourth amendment interest against the promotion of enforcing doc-
umentation law, the Court should have given more weight to three
significant factors. First, the Court should have given more weight
to one's greater expectation of privacy aboard a pleasure vessel
which may even be used as a temporary dwelling. Certainly per-
sons traveling in a 40-foot sailboat, which may serve as a residence
and a repository of personal effects, and where both its occupants
and contents are not actually in plain view to the public, have a
125. 413 U.S. at 273.
126. 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975).
127. Id. at 896.
128. Id. at 884.
129. 428 U.S. at 562.
130. 440 U.S. at 654.
131. Id. at 661.
132. Id.
1984]
17
Young: Criminal Procedure - Vessels in Inland Waters Are Subject to Susp
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
greater expectation of privacy than automobile travelers. Second,
and related to the first factor, the Court should have weighed
heavier the nature of the boarding because it was more intrusive
than the condemned stops made in the automobile cases. In the
case of a vessel stop, the officer actually boards the vessel and is
automatically in a position to view its contents including personal
belongings just inside an open hatch. Third, and most importantly,
the Court should have given more weight to the fundamental pro-
tection of the fourth amendment, which extends even to wrongdo-
ers. Furthermore, the Court failed to realize the extent to which
acceptable results could be achieved without a system of "random
stops." In Prouse it was noted that enforcement interests could be
substantially furthered by stopping drivers who are actually ob-
served committing violations.3 3 There is no reason why the same is
not true for vessels.
A question which the Court did not address and which may be
raised in cases interpreting Villamonte-Marquez is how far inland
does a vessel have to be before it is no longer in waters providing
ready access to the sea? The Henry Morgan II was anchored 18
miles inland,134 and it would seem that once spotted, a boat of its
size and speed capabilities could not reach the open sea from that
distance without being tracked or even overcome by the sophisti-
cated government vessels and aircraft. Would the result be the
same if the Henry Morgan II had been achored 25 or 35 miles in-
land? Another point avoided by the Court but likely to arise in
future cases is the potential for abuse of official discretion. Could a
boarding be held invalid because the officers were searching solely
for drugs, disguised by a documentation inspection? Thus, a major
question remains as to whether there is really an objectionable lim-
itation to random stops.
In addition to its other shortcomings, the majority failed to
explore other alternatives to the suspicionless boarding that would
further the governmental interest while protecting the individual's
fourth amendment interest. First, an "area warrant" as suggested
in Camara v. Municipal Court'85 could be issued by a magistrate
before customs officers set out on patrol. The warrant, while not
specifying a particular vessel or vessels, could set out circum-
stances and manners in which vessels inspections could be carried
133. Id. at 659-60.
134. 103 S. Ct. at 2576.
135. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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out.
A second alternative, and related to the first, is to require cus-
toms officers boarding vessels without suspicion to first find certain
objective criteria characteristics of smugglers' vessels, or at least
insure that stops are carried out in accordance with a neutral ad-
ministrative plan that minimizes officers' discretion.
Third, searching could be conducted at the "functional
equivalent" of a border as suggested in Almeida-Sanchez. 36 A
"functional equivalent" of the border is most likely to be the port
of entry, but a bay adjacent to the ocean could serve as well.18 7
Fourth, as pointed out in the dissent, the government's job
could be accomplished by simply pulling along the boat and asking
a crewman to board the officer's boat with the appropriate docu-
ments. " ' The officer could merely question occupants of a vessel
without boarding, and if the responses were found inadequate or
gave rise to some probable cause to suspect criminal activity then a
boarding could be warranted.
Fifth, possible alternatives to current registration markings
should be explored in order to provide a more uniform and effi-
cient system. Finally, the government might establish temporary or
permanent inspection stations that could issue a colored decal sig-
nifying compliance. To ensure routine inspection, the decal colors
could be changed from time to time and boats without current de-
cals could be stopped and inspected." 9
As far as North Carolina is concerned, the impact of Vil-
lamonte-Marquez could be felt due to the State's long coast line
and numerous inlets and rivers. In United States v. Harper,1 4 0 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that stopping and
searching a 250-foot vessel in the high seas while bound for
Morehead City was reasonable. The Coast Guard, acting pursuant
to 14 U.S.C. § 89, stationed itself in a traveling route of boats
bound to the United States from South America.14 1 The boarding,
although without suspicion, was found reasonable because of its
systematic nature which did not allow for the will and whim of the
136. Id. at 273.
137. See United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1976); see
also Note, High On The Seas: Drug Smuggling, The Fourth Amendment, and
Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REv. 724, 733 (1980).
138. 103 S. Ct. at 2590.
139. Note, supra note 137, at 744.
140. 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 37.
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officers,142 the lowered expectation of privacy of a commercial ves-
sel sailing on high seas, 143 and the practical difficulties in policing
American vessels on the high seas.1 44 Thus, the Court of Appeals
also found it necessary to go beyond statutory authority for the
validity of the boarding. Since the officers in Harper were follow-
ing an administratively neutral plan which limited their discretion
and since the vessel was in a well traveled sea lane where commer-
cial vessels could expect document inspections, the boarding was
valid. This case involved a high seas search. North Carolina courts
have not dealt with an inland stop and search such as Villamonte-
Marquez, but it is likely that since the Villamonte-Marquez hold-
ing allows full discretion to government officials in boarding inland
vessels, then the discretion-limiting feature of the Harper ap-
proach may be disregarded. Thus, vessels in inland water of North
Carolina providing ready access to the sea are subject to suspi-
cionless boardings by customs officers to make documents inspec-
tions, absent any discretion-limiting device.
CONCLUSION
The suspicionless boarding in Villamonte-Marquez was held
reasonable because of the substantial differences between the
waterborne setting and that of public highways which prevent the
practical use of discretion-limiting fixed checkpoints, the complex-
ity of vessel documentation as compared to vehicle documentation,
the important public interests in the enforcement of documenta-
tion laws which deter smuggling, and the limited nature of the in-
trusion.1 4 The effect of Villamonte-Marquez in regard to vessel
owners who travel in waters near the open seas that their expecta-
tions of privacy are severely diminished since they are now subject
to being stopped and having customs officers board their vessels to
inspect documents. The boarding need not be based on probable
cause, reasonable suspicion, or any other objective criteria save the
officer's unbridled discretion.
Concerning the automobile stop and search cases relied on, the
Court consistently held that any search and seizure requires proba-
ble cause, a reasonable suspicion or another discretion-limiting de-
vice such as the use of a fixed checkpoint. These cases provide a
142. Id. at 38.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 39.
145. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
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strong foundation of precedent for issues arising out of the search
and seizure of persons traveling in their personal vehicles. The ma-
jority in Villamonte-Marquez departs from this precedent and
fails to apply the fourth amendment principle against arbitrary
governmental intrusion in an analytically sound manner.
The decision in Villamonte-Marquez reinforces the statement
that the fourth amendment protections shrink in proportion to the
quantity of drugs involved. 4 6 It serves notice that the "reasonable-
ness" requirement may be restricted to further governmental inter-
est in extensive social problems. However, the decision does not
clearly indicate exactly how Section 1581(a) applies to suspi-
cionless boardings since the statute is not the real basis of the
decision.
Also, the majority's only limit to the suspicionless boarding is
that it be conducted in inland waters providing ready access to the
sea. The question remains as to how far inland a vessel owner has
to be before he can object. Another problem left unresolved by the
decision is the possibility it opens for the abuse of police discre-
tion. May customs officers initiate a sweeping battle against smug-
gling disguised as an attempt to step up documentation
inspection?
While enlarging the authority of customs officers will probably
increase their effectiveness in stopping drug traffic into our Nation
via numerous inland waterways, we are reminded that the court
which "sat during a period in our history when the Nation was
confronted with a law enforcement problem of . . .enforcing the
Prohibition laws . .. [riesisted the pressure of official expedience
against the guarantee of the fourth amendment.' ' 7
Wallace R. Young, Jr.
146. See supra note 1.
147. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973).
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